2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
82f7fa7545 fix(1.0.9): revert OAuth popup BrowserWindow — Google detects embedded popups
1.0.1 ("trusted-domains OAuth popups") changed setWindowOpenHandler to
return action:'allow' with overrideBrowserWindowOptions for trusted
domains (Google, Yandex, etc.), opening a real Electron BrowserWindow
as popup. The reasoning was that OAuth flows need window.opener +
postMessage. That's correct for some flows but wrong for YouTube-style
login, which uses straight redirect.

Worse: Google specifically detects popup-style embedded browsers
(Electron BrowserWindow has distinct fingerprint vs real Chrome popup)
and blocks them with "Возможно, этот браузер небезопасны". The user
reported this stopped working after 1.0.0 — that's why.

Restore the 1.0.0 behavior for trusted domains: deny the popup and call
view.webContents.loadURL(newUrl) in the same view. The OAuth flow now
happens as a normal in-place navigation: YouTube → accounts.google.com
→ (user logs in) → redirect back to YouTube. No popup, no fingerprint
mismatch. The only UX loss is the popup window aesthetic; behavior is
functionally identical and matches what worked in 1.0.0.

Untrusted cross-domain still asks for confirmation, same-origin popups
still navigate in-place — unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-16 22:31:37 +03:00
b5e1296a7a fix(1.0.8): strip cliqz adblocker preload — breaks CSP-strict sites
cliqz/adblocker-electron registers its preload at session level via
session.setPreloads([...preloads, PRELOAD_PATH]) inside
enableBlockingInSession. That preload injects inline <script> elements
via doc.createElement('script') + script.appendChild(textNode) +
parent.appendChild(script). On modern strict-CSP sites this breaks:

- Trusted Types (YouTube, Gmail): "An HTMLScriptElement was directly
  modified and will not be executed" — 52+ console errors.
- Nonce-required CSP (kinogo via Cloudflare): "Refused to execute inline
  script ... script-src 'nonce-...'" — competing with Cloudflare's
  challenge JS, likely the proximate cause of the 403 we see on kinogo
  (CF treats the broken page as bot).

Remove the cliqz preload from each session immediately after
enableBlockingInSession. The network/CSP/blockers attached via
webRequest hooks remain active — only the script-injection layer for
anti-anti-adblock scriptlets is lost, which is a niche feature that
breaks more sites than it fixes.

The 1.0.7 Blink TrustedDOMTypes disable stays (defense in depth, no
cost). The 1.0.6 CSP-header strip stays removed (adblocker overwrites
the webRequest listener anyway).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-16 22:24:47 +03:00
2 changed files with 34 additions and 21 deletions

53
main.js
View File

@@ -111,7 +111,27 @@ function getBlocker() {
function enableBlockingInSession(sess) { function enableBlockingInSession(sess) {
getBlocker() getBlocker()
.then(b => { b.enableBlockingInSession(sess); console.log('[adblock] enabled for session'); }) .then(b => {
b.enableBlockingInSession(sess);
// Remove the cliqz preload script that the blocker just registered on this
// session. The preload injects inline <script> elements (via createTextNode +
// appendChild) to neutralize anti-adblock scripts, but:
// • Strict-CSP sites (kinogo via Cloudflare, etc.) reject inline scripts
// without a matching nonce → "Refused to execute inline script".
// • Trusted-Types sites (YouTube, Gmail) reject `script.appendChild(text)`
// → "HTMLScriptElement was directly modified" (52 errors).
// We keep the adblocker's network blocking and CSP filtering (via the still-
// attached webRequest hooks), losing only the niche scriptlet/cosmetic-DOM
// injection layer that breaks more sites than it helps.
const before = sess.getPreloads();
const after = before.filter(p => !/adblocker-electron-preload/i.test(p));
if (after.length !== before.length) {
sess.setPreloads(after);
console.log('[adblock] enabled for session (preload script disabled)');
} else {
console.log('[adblock] enabled for session');
}
})
.catch(e => console.warn('[adblock] failed to enable:', e.message)); .catch(e => console.warn('[adblock] failed to enable:', e.message));
} }
@@ -639,37 +659,30 @@ ipcMain.on('create-view', async (_event, name, url, imageUrl, _zoom, useProxy) =
trackNavigation(newUrl); trackNavigation(newUrl);
}); });
view.webContents.on('will-redirect', (_e, u) => trackNavigation(u)); view.webContents.on('will-redirect', (_e, u) => trackNavigation(u));
view.webContents.setWindowOpenHandler(({ url: newUrl, frameName, features }) => { view.webContents.setWindowOpenHandler(({ url: newUrl }) => {
let newHostname = ''; let newHostname = '';
try { newHostname = new URL(newUrl).hostname; } catch (_) {} try { newHostname = new URL(newUrl).hostname; } catch (_) {}
// Trusted domain → open as real popup BrowserWindow with same session. // Trusted domain (Google, Yandex, etc.) → navigate IN-PLACE, no popup.
// This is what OAuth flows need: window.opener.postMessage() works, // 1.0.1 tried opening a real popup BrowserWindow here for OAuth postMessage
// popup can close itself when done, parent stays on the original page. // flows — turns out Google specifically detects popup-style embedded
// browsers and blocks OAuth ("Возможно, этот браузер небезопасны").
// YouTube-style login uses standard redirect flow, so in-place navigation
// works AND avoids the popup fingerprint. 1.0.0 behavior, restored.
if (newHostname && isTrustedDomain(newHostname)) { if (newHostname && isTrustedDomain(newHostname)) {
return { trackNavigation(newUrl);
action: 'allow', view.webContents.loadURL(newUrl);
overrideBrowserWindowOptions: { return { action: 'deny' };
width: 520, height: 640,
parent: mainWindow,
autoHideMenuBar: true,
webPreferences: {
session: view.webContents.session,
contextIsolation: true,
nodeIntegration: false,
},
},
};
} }
// Untrusted cross-domain → ask the user (original behavior). // Untrusted cross-domain → ask the user.
if (origHostname && newHostname && newHostname !== origHostname) { if (origHostname && newHostname && newHostname !== origHostname) {
pendingNavigate = { view, url: newUrl }; pendingNavigate = { view, url: newUrl };
setConfirm(`Перейти на "${newHostname}"?`, 'navigate-confirmed'); setConfirm(`Перейти на "${newHostname}"?`, 'navigate-confirmed');
return { action: 'deny' }; return { action: 'deny' };
} }
// Same-origin popup → just navigate the current view. // Same-origin popup → navigate the current view.
trackNavigation(newUrl); trackNavigation(newUrl);
view.webContents.loadURL(newUrl); view.webContents.loadURL(newUrl);
return { action: 'deny' }; return { action: 'deny' };

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{ {
"name": "ESH-Media", "name": "ESH-Media",
"version": "1.0.7", "version": "1.0.9",
"private": true, "private": true,
"main": "main.js", "main": "main.js",
"scripts": { "scripts": {