fix(1.0.11): Google login — OAuth popup in clean partition

Series 1.0.1 — 1.0.10 chased wrong hypotheses. Real causes of Google's /v3/signin/rejected detector on Electron: - WebContentsView embedded view shape - Explicit session.setProxy({proxyRules}) — Chromium routes CONNECT differently than through system proxy - Cleaned UA paired with Sec-CH-UA="Chromium" — read as dishonesty - DOM injections (chrome.* spoof, fade-overlay) Fix: - accounts.google.com opens in top-level BrowserWindow popup - Dedicated persist:google-login partition with no setProxy/setUserAgent (inherits Windows system proxy + default UA with honest Electron tag) - After login, .google.com/.youtube.com cookies migrate to parent session, parent view reloads to pick up logged-in state - Removed global UA cleanup — all sessions use default UA now Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 00:36:49 +03:00
parent 103c2d1e09
commit 779d621dd1
2 changed files with 129 additions and 29 deletions
--- a/main.js
+++ b/main.js
@@ -214,7 +214,8 @@ let pendingNavigate = null; // { view, url } — cross-domain redirect awaiting
 function getProxySession() {
  if (!proxySession) {
    proxySession = session.fromPartition('persist:proxy');
-    proxySession.setUserAgent(app.userAgentFallback);
+    // No setUserAgent — partition uses app.userAgentFallback by default, and
+    // calling setUserAgent appears to be a fingerprint signal Google reads.
    enableBlockingInSession(proxySession);
  }
  return proxySession;
@@ -223,7 +224,6 @@ function getProxySession() {
 function getDirectSession() {
  if (!directSession) {
    directSession = session.fromPartition('persist:direct');
-    directSession.setUserAgent(app.userAgentFallback);
    directSession.setProxy({ proxyRules: 'direct://' });
    enableBlockingInSession(directSession);
  }
@@ -629,6 +629,111 @@ async function restoreSession() {
  }
 }

+// Google's anti-abuse JS at /v3/signin/_/AccountsSignInUi/browserinfo rejects
+// any session that has an *explicit* setProxy({ proxyRules }) applied — the way
+// Chromium routes through such a proxy (explicit CONNECT etc.) is fingerprintable.
+// Sessions inheriting Windows' system proxy pass cleanly. So we open the OAuth
+// flow in a dedicated partition that we never call setProxy() on, then copy the
+// resulting .google.com / .youtube.com cookies into the parent view's session
+// so the user appears logged-in there too.
+//
+// The popup is a top-level BrowserWindow (not WebContentsView) — embedded view
+// shape is also a signal Google reads. No preload, no chrome.* spoof, no fade
+// overlay: anything we touch on the DOM/globals could trip the detector.
+const LOGIN_PARTITION = 'persist:google-login';
+
+function isGoogleLoginUrl(u) {
+  try {
+    const h = new URL(u).hostname;
+    return h === 'accounts.google.com' || h.endsWith('.accounts.google.com');
+  } catch (_) { return false; }
+}
+
+async function migrateGoogleCookies(fromSess, toSess) {
+  // Copy .google.com and .youtube.com cookies so the parent view sees the
+  // just-established login session. Domains must include both bare and
+  // dot-prefixed so subdomain cookies are picked up.
+  const domains = ['.google.com', 'accounts.google.com', '.youtube.com', 'www.youtube.com', '.googleusercontent.com'];
+  for (const domain of domains) {
+    let cookies = [];
+    try { cookies = await fromSess.cookies.get({ domain }); } catch (_) { continue; }
+    for (const c of cookies) {
+      if (c.expirationDate && c.expirationDate * 1000 < Date.now()) continue;
+      const hostOnly = c.domain.startsWith('.') ? c.domain.slice(1) : c.domain;
+      const url = `${c.secure ? 'https' : 'http'}://${hostOnly}${c.path}`;
+      const opts = {
+        url, name: c.name, value: c.value, path: c.path,
+        secure: !!c.secure, httpOnly: !!c.httpOnly,
+      };
+      if (c.domain.startsWith('.')) opts.domain = c.domain;
+      if (c.expirationDate) opts.expirationDate = c.expirationDate;
+      if (c.sameSite && c.sameSite !== 'unspecified') opts.sameSite = c.sameSite;
+      try { await toSess.cookies.set(opts); }
+      catch (e) { console.warn('[oauth] copy cookie failed:', c.name, e.message); }
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+const activeLoginPopups = new Set();
+
+function openLoginPopup(parentView, url) {
+  for (const p of activeLoginPopups) {
+    if (p.parentView === parentView && !p.window.isDestroyed()) {
+      p.window.focus();
+      p.window.webContents.loadURL(url);
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+  // Dedicated login session — NEVER called setProxy() on, so Chromium uses Windows
+  // system proxy (e.g. Clash) the way a real Chrome would.
+  const loginSess = session.fromPartition(LOGIN_PARTITION);
+  const popup = new BrowserWindow({
+    width: 600,
+    height: 750,
+    title: 'Вход в Google',
+    parent: mainWindow,
+    modal: false,
+    autoHideMenuBar: true,
+    webPreferences: {
+      session: loginSess,
+      contextIsolation: true,
+      nodeIntegration: false,
+      // explicitly NO preload, NO injected UA
+    },
+  });
+  attachDevToolsShortcut(popup.webContents);
+  const entry = { window: popup, parentView };
+  activeLoginPopups.add(entry);
+
+  let finalizing = false;
+  const finishLogin = async (newUrl) => {
+    if (finalizing) return;
+    finalizing = true;
+    try {
+      await migrateGoogleCookies(loginSess, parentView.webContents.session);
+      if (!parentView.webContents.isDestroyed()) parentView.webContents.reload();
+    } finally {
+      if (!popup.isDestroyed()) popup.close();
+    }
+  };
+
+  const checkRedirect = (newUrl) => {
+    if (!newUrl || isGoogleLoginUrl(newUrl)) return;
+    try {
+      const h = new URL(newUrl).hostname;
+      // Login flow handed control back to a non-Google host (youtube.com etc.) → success.
+      if (h && !h.endsWith('.google.com') && h !== 'google.com') {
+        finishLogin(newUrl);
+      }
+    } catch (_) {}
+  };
+  popup.webContents.on('will-redirect', (_e, u) => checkRedirect(u));
+  popup.webContents.on('did-navigate', (_e, u) => checkRedirect(u));
+
+  popup.on('closed', () => { activeLoginPopups.delete(entry); });
+  popup.loadURL(url);
+}
+
 // --- IPC ---

 ipcMain.on('create-view', async (_event, name, url, imageUrl, _zoom, useProxy) => {
@@ -663,13 +768,6 @@ ipcMain.on('create-view', async (_event, name, url, imageUrl, _zoom, useProxy) =
  view.setBounds(getViewBounds());
  attachDevToolsShortcut(view.webContents);

-  // Experimental: spoof chrome.* JS objects on every page so Google's
-  // "embedded browser" detector sees a real-Chrome-shaped global. Runs on
-  // dom-ready which is AFTER <head> scripts, so detection scripts that ran
-  // there have already seen the un-spoofed environment — this fix only
-  // helps if Google's gate is re-checked on form submit / later events.
-  // TLS fingerprint (JA3) is server-side and unaffected; if Google flags us
-  // there, no client-side spoof helps. Best-effort attempt only.
  view.webContents.on('dom-ready', () => {
    view.webContents.executeJavaScript(CHROME_SPOOF_JS).catch(() => {});
  });
@@ -714,6 +812,8 @@ ipcMain.on('create-view', async (_event, name, url, imageUrl, _zoom, useProxy) =

  view.webContents.on('will-navigate', (e, newUrl) => {
    if (newUrl.startsWith('data:')) { trackNavigation(newUrl); return; }
+    // accounts.google.com → top-level BrowserWindow popup (see openLoginPopup).
+    if (isGoogleLoginUrl(newUrl)) { e.preventDefault(); openLoginPopup(view, newUrl); return; }
    let newHostname = '';
    try { newHostname = new URL(newUrl).hostname; } catch (_) { trackNavigation(newUrl); return; }
    if (origHostname && newHostname && newHostname !== origHostname && !isTrustedDomain(newHostname)) {
@@ -724,17 +824,18 @@ ipcMain.on('create-view', async (_event, name, url, imageUrl, _zoom, useProxy) =
    }
    trackNavigation(newUrl);
  });
-  view.webContents.on('will-redirect', (_e, u) => trackNavigation(u));
+  view.webContents.on('will-redirect', (e, u) => {
+    if (isGoogleLoginUrl(u)) { e.preventDefault(); openLoginPopup(view, u); return; }
+    trackNavigation(u);
+  });
  view.webContents.setWindowOpenHandler(({ url: newUrl }) => {
+    // accounts.google.com → top-level BrowserWindow popup (see openLoginPopup).
+    if (isGoogleLoginUrl(newUrl)) { openLoginPopup(view, newUrl); return { action: 'deny' }; }
+
    let newHostname = '';
    try { newHostname = new URL(newUrl).hostname; } catch (_) {}

-    // Trusted domain (Google, Yandex, etc.) → navigate IN-PLACE, no popup.
-    // 1.0.1 tried opening a real popup BrowserWindow here for OAuth postMessage
-    // flows — turns out Google specifically detects popup-style embedded
-    // browsers and blocks OAuth ("Возможно, этот браузер небезопасны").
-    // YouTube-style login uses standard redirect flow, so in-place navigation
-    // works AND avoids the popup fingerprint. 1.0.0 behavior, restored.
+    // Trusted domain → navigate IN-PLACE. (Google login is handled above as popup.)
    if (newHostname && isTrustedDomain(newHostname)) {
      trackNavigation(newUrl);
      view.webContents.loadURL(newUrl);
@@ -1286,18 +1387,16 @@ ipcMain.on('action', (_event, action) => {
 // --- App lifecycle ---

 app.whenReady().then(async () => {
-  // Strip Electron/app tokens from User-Agent: Google blocks Electron's default UA
-  // with "Поддержка JavaScript отключена" on accounts.google.com. We keep the Chrome
-  // version Electron advertises (sufficient for modern features) but remove the
-  // Electron/X.X.X and ESH-Media/X.X.X identifiers.
-  const cleanUserAgent = app.userAgentFallback
-    .replace(/Electron\/[\d.]+\s*/g, '')
-    .replace(/ESH-Media\/[\d.]+\s*/g, '')
-    .replace(/\s+/g, ' ')
-    .trim();
-  console.log('[ua]', cleanUserAgent);
-  app.userAgentFallback = cleanUserAgent;
-  session.defaultSession.setUserAgent(cleanUserAgent);
+  // UA: KEEP the default Electron-tagged UA. We previously stripped Electron/X.X.X
+  // and ESH-Media/X.X.X (v1.0.2 fix) — but Google's anti-abuse JS at /browserinfo
+  // treats an *honest* Electron UA as a legitimate non-Chrome client and lets the
+  // login through. A spoofed-Chrome UA paired with Sec-CH-UA="Chromium" (no
+  // "Google Chrome" brand, since Electron compiles without it) reads as
+  // dishonesty → "Возможно, этот браузер небезопасны". Also, calling
+  // setUserAgent() on a custom partition appears to be its own fingerprint signal
+  // (bw-system.js test passes without it; bw-fresh.js with the same UA value but
+  // explicit setUserAgent does not). So we do nothing here.
+  console.log('[ua] (unchanged)', app.userAgentFallback);

  // Add Referer to image requests so hotlink protection doesn't block them.
  // (Sec-CH-UA spoofing was tried in 1.0.4 and caused white pages — reverted.
@@ -1333,6 +1432,7 @@ app.whenReady().then(async () => {
  enableBlockingInSession(session.defaultSession);
  getProxySession();
  getDirectSession();
+
  await loadExtensions();
  await createWindow();